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Plato

as a narrator,

a

Study in the myths

by

W. A. Harris.

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The Begetting of Erôs " [illegible]
The Winged Souls " [illegible]
The Three Classes of Men " [illegible]
The Vision of Er " [illegible]
The Changing World-Periods " [illegible]
Atlantis " 101
The Origin of the Universe " [illegible]
The Golden Age " [illegible]

[illegible]

In the preparation of this dissertation the following works have [illegible] consulted besides various commentaries:–

Müller u. Steinhart: Platon's sämmtliche Werke

Leipzig 1850

Heinrich von Stein: Geschichte des Platonismus

Göttingen 1862

Jowett: Dialogues of Plato   Oxford 1875

Novák: Platon u. die Rhetorik, Jahrb. Phil. sup. XIII

Leipzig 1883.

Grote's Plato   London 1885

[illegible]   Leipzig 1871

Zeller: Philosophie der Griechen, II, [illegible]

Also Ueberweg has been consulted and especially [illegible] edition of the Sophistes and Politicus: Introduction to the Statesman pp. [illegible] – xli.

The following dissertations have also been consulted:-

Schwanitz: Die Mythen des Plato Leipzig 1852

Deuschle: Ueber platonische Mythen, insbesondere

[illegible]

Volquardsen: Progr. Schleswig 1871

Foster. Platonischen mythen Rastatt 1873

Westermayer: Der Mythus in Platos Protagoras

Nürnberg 1877

Introduction

Besides the many distinctive features of Plato's system of Philosophy, we see a further peculiarity in his use of the myths, which occur here and there throughout his dialogues. The part these play as an aid and embellishment to his dialectic, together with their proper interpretation, has given rise to much discussion and has caused much trouble to eminent philosophers. Indeed, so numerous and various are the views(1) which have been presented, that one is forcibly reminded of the interminable question of the Platonic canon. Since, then, so many are the writers that have dealt with the myths from a philosophic point of view, there seems no excuse to add another to the already too numerous discussions. It is the purpose of this study, therefore, to present the myths from the other side, the linguistic or artistic side — a side which seems to have received very little treat-

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(1) [illegible] in [illegible] Programm (S[illegible], 1871) gives the views of the [illegible] scholars from Aristotle to Zeller.

ment crept incidentally. Yet, while our chief business is with the expression, we cannot be entirely heedless of the thought because of the intimate connection between the two — an idea ~~very prettily~~ expressed by Plato when he says ὡς ἄρα τοὺς λόγους, ὧνπέρ ἐστιν ἐξηγηταί, τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ ξυγγενεῖς ὄντας (Tim. 29.B).

The chief difficulty of interpreting the myths lies in the fact that myths in part are poetical [illegible] philosopher, and how much of the myth is laden with deep philosophical thought, and how much is art is not always easy to determine. Very properly Zeller(1) warns against pressing for much philosophical construction and confining to strictly poetical narration; for in the Symposium, Politicus, and in parts of other dialogues (Phr. & Rep.) artistic considerations rather than philosophic necessity determines the use of the mythus.

The Greeks as a nation were thoroughly steeped in fable. In the nursery they doubtless learned the lore

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(1) Philosophie der Griechen II¹ S. 582 (4te aufl.)

of birds and beasts; from their Bible – Homer – they recited the deeds of legendary gods and heroes; and these stories altered, enlarged were again and again presented from the stage. Aristophanes(1) gives us an insight into the strong hold which fables and stories had on the popular mind. To the Greeks the myths were not a "body of fixed dogma"(2), but in the age of literature they were a living organism; so Plato could easily and with propriety invent tales of Egypt or any other country (Phr.275.B).

The term myth is of very wide application including everything from the expression of a general truth, a natural law, a moral or religious idea to the concocting of a mere fictitious story. Thus we see it bordering closely on allegory, legend, fable and sometimes even made loosely to include one or the other of them. To get a clearer idea of the myth we might attempt a distinction. In allegory, as in

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(1) See Wasps 1177 and other places in the same play.

2) Symonds' Greek Poets Vol. II. p. 34

myth, some general idea is expressed; but allegory differs from myth in that the idea is grasped first and the form invented and adapted to this — it is conscious and reflective; while the myth is spontaneous, the thought and the form springing into being together. *Legend*, like myth is the unconscious embodiment of popular feeling, but it has to do rather with facts as concrete, with history and life; while myth deals more with facts as abstract, with speculation and thought. Between these two, however, we can often make no distinction and it is needless to resort to much metaphysical refinement. The *fable* is a fictitious story contrived to inculcate a moral, and like parable — a similitude for representing abstract truth to the imagination — it is the result of conscious invention. According to Lessing the fable embodies a moral in a special case; this is invested with reality and narrated as a story. In form the

narrative is usually of the simplest kind, and incident follows upon incident in such a way as to dispense almost entirely with the rules of art.

Though some of Plato's myths approach in character to one or the other of these, they may yet be classed as true myths. For the allegorical type of the myth, we may take Aristophanes' tale in the Symposium (189E and the 'Birth of Love' (ib. 203 A). The story in the Protagoras (320.C.) also has allegorical traits, but it is put in the mouth of a Sophist and so is exceptional. As an example of pure allegory, we have 'The Cave' (Rep. VII 514 A.) which though so considered by some, is no myth, for the narrative form is lacking. In the story of Theuth (Phr. 274 C) and in the Critias we have a legendary stripe; in the story of Gyges (Rep. II. 359.D), which is introduced by way of example,(1) we have an instance of almost pure legend. All the more philosophical myths, in so far as they have a moral

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(1) For another and famous specimen of Fictitious Example see "Hercules at the Road-forks" Xen. Mem. II. 1, 21.

purpose or assist in grasping truth, present points of similarity with the fable and the parable.

Deuschle[1], bringing down myth to its narrow limits, defines it as "Eine der Volksreligion entnommene Form der Einkleidung für bestimmte Ideen". He then proceeds to distinguish between the myth of the people and the philosophic myth: "Die Mythen des Volkes schliessen dogmatische Sätze in sich; aber diese fassen sich zu einer einzigen Anschauung zusammen, welche ein Sein, eine vom Glauben erfasste Nothwendigkeit in der Form geschichtlicher Existenz, d. i. in der Form des Werdens und der Entwickelung sich zu versinnlichen und an der Stelle begrifflichen Zusammenhangs durch historische Verknüpfung zu erklären sucht".

The philosophic myth, then, is the distinctive feature of Plato. Philosophy was the outgrowth of mythology, and the use of allegory as a popular

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[1] Ueber platonische Mythen, insbesondere den Mythus im platonischen Phädrus (Hanau 1854) S. 3

manner of instruction was a legacy left Plato by his predecessors(1) but he alone employed the myth to suggest and express conceptions which transcend experience — the origin of cosmos, the origin and destiny of man — conceptions beyond the range of his dialectic. Thus from one side the myths are proof of his artistic ability, but from a scientific point of view they show a limitation of his methodical thought, and are a sign of weakness rather than of strength; or as Zeller says, they show the point at which it becomes evident that as yet he cannot be wholly a philosopher, because he is still too much of a poet.(2) Therefore though most of the myths of Plato will fall under the definition of Deuschle given above, we cannot thus narrow down all, for [illegible].

With regard to the philosophic worth of myth [illegible]

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1) See Volquardsen S. 8
2) Zeller: Philosophie der Griechen II' S. 581 (4th Aufl.)

[illegible] and philosophic myth [illegible] [illegible](1). The former [illegible] of serious consideration, but from the latter he would extract what remnants there might be of an earlier true philosophy. Similarly also the Platonic Socrates rebukes Phaedrus for thinking more of the source of the myth than of its truth(2). It was for the truth of the general scope of the myth, and not for the truth of details, that Plato contended(3).

In addition to this philosophic element, there is in the myths also a religious and a poetic element. The Greeks were a religious people, but they were [illegible] with [illegible]. They had no uniform and universal system of theology but a mythology handed down by tradition, and subjected to many variations both by the people and the poets. The practice indulged in by [illegible] [illegible]

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1) Cf. [illegible] 11, 8, 14.

2) Phaedrus 275 B. 3) Cf. Phaedo 114 D.

interpretation to this mythical religion, Plato[1] disapproves as useless and ill-suited to the nature of the myth. But though he rejects the spiritless natural explanation of even so tempting a story as 'Boreas and Orithyia'[2], yet, says Steinhart[3], he points, by his allusion to Typho, to a more spirited — an ethical interpretation of mythology. In the Republic[4] we have quite fully Plato's views in regard to popular mythology: [illegible] accepted and taught to children, and the poets, especially Homer and Hesiod, are to be blamed because they falsely represent the nature of gods and heroes. In other words Plato would banish from mythology everything that is unworthy of the gods; nor are such things to be admitted even on the plea that they are allegorical. He would have the poets conform their tales to this simple rule of theology: οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν, ἀεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον[5]; and

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1) Phaedrus 229 B. f. 2) ib. 229 D. 3) Platon's Sämmtliche Werke, Müller u. Steinhart, IV. 76. 4) Repub. III. 377 A. f. 5) Repub. III. 377 A.

as god is truly good, he must be represented as such.

Thus we see that Plato does not wish to exclude Hellenic religion from his state, but lays Hellenic mythus as the main foundation of instruction, only he would rid them of everything impure and harmful. With him the Idea of the Good is the Deity, virtue and knowledge are worship, and indeed his philosophy is moral conduct as well as theory and speculation. For him the worth of the mythus lies in its moral effect, rather than in its theoretic truth.(1) Since he did not take lightly the popular religion, nor seek to overturn it, as did some of the sophists, he restored it to an ethic norm, and with his mythus he bound his own philosophy to the mythical religion from which philosophy sprung. By his frequent appeal to Tradition and antiquity for the authority and assurance of his myths, Plato strives to touch his hearers not alone through the

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1) Zeller: Philosophie d. Gr. II' 930 f. and compare Fischer: De mythis Platonicis (Königsb. 1865) p. 17f.

intellect, but through the religious sense as well. Ackermann, indeed, considers that what Moses and the Prophets are for the Evangelists, the god-inspired bards are for Plato.[1] But Acke[illegible] little too hot in pursuit of the Christian element in Plato.

As to the high poetic thought and diction[2] in Plato much has been said both in antiquity and in modern times, and all writers on his life and works recognize in him the poet as well as the philosopher. Dionysius[3], to be sure, finds fault with the high-flown poetic diction of a certain passage [illegible] disagreeably poetical style — a passage, however, which Aristotle, [illegible] amply defended in his Rhetoric.[4] We know th[illegible]

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[1] See Ackermann page 13. [2]. To a discussion of the poetic nature of the Platonic philosophy, Raabe has devot[illegible] nature. (Rotterdam 1866). [3] De admir. vi dem. ch 7 (p. 971 R.) [4] Rhet. III. 7.

for a long time after the birth of philosophy, poetry was the only medium through which it expressed its thought, and even after it adopted prose to its needs, much of [illegible]ed. In youth Plato himself was busied with poetry, and, if we may judge by the artistic structure of his [illegible] it is not [illegible] so much that is poetical. But it is mainly in the my- [illegible][1]. [illegible] in that [illegible] he [illegible] For [illegible] draws upon the rich stores of Homer, Orpheus and [illegible]ular story, yet in the main he depends upon

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[1] [illegible] S. 75 [illegible]

not naive religion, but conscious poetry, not [illegible] [illegible] but poetically finished masterpiece.

[illegible]. The [illegible] have been compared to epic songs; the procession of the gods in the Phaedrus has been compared one of the odes of Pindar. In Plato the poetic genius of the Greek nation speaks with [illegible]. [illegible] soars from dry dialectics into the realm of [illegible], and [illegible] furnishing the probable reason for things which are beyond the reach of sense-perception.

It is natural that a poetic mind should seek to communicate with humanity through figures, for ordinary language is too feeble to express its thoughts, and from sheer poverty [illegible], [illegible] alone can give some approximation to the intensity of its feelings.

[illegible] recognized as important for the poetic [illegible]

ciation of Plato. Novák says of these myths: "Es zeigt sich uns Platon auch hier darin so, wie er selbst war und dachte, als bei den nachahmenden dialektischen [illegible], worin er gewisse seiner [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]".(1)

Even though it were doubted that here we could perceive the true Plato better than in the strict dialectic, a study of the myths would, nevertheless, commend itself, since in these we find Plato in his happiest mood. It is, therefore, the purpose of this dissertation to make a study of these unique narratives, testing them as far as practicable by [illegible] standards.

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(1) Novák: Platon u. die Rhetorik, Jahrb. Phil. Sup. XIII. S. 502 Compare also Hirzel: Das Rhetorische bei Platon. S. 74 f.

Forms of Narrative

Before passing to a discussion of Plato as a narrator, it would be well to take a brief glance at the different forms which a narrative may assume, for narrative must of necessity be affected by the department as well as by the individual narrator; the poet does not tell his story as the prose writer, nor on the other hand, does the epic poet narrate like the lyric poet, nor the historian like the orator. With the hope, then, of getting a clearer view of the limitations as well as liberties of Plato, we shall attempt some differentiation of narrative style in the six great departments of art – Epic, Lyric, the Drama, History, Oratory, Philosophy.

Epic. The first department [illegible] to consider is epic poetry and for this we shall confine ourselves to Homer. According to Aristotle[1] epic poetry is drama without actors, that is, it is narrative poetry which

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[1] Περὶ Ποιητικῆς 23,1. Compare Jebb's note: Homer p 4

without the aid of acting imitates by means of its language alone. Though this be true, Homer does [illegible] place before us real living men, moving objects and scenes [illegible]. This [illegible] secured by the poet through what Plato (Rep. III. 392 D.) calls his μίμησις, — namely, telling his story as much as possible through the words and actions of his characters. So rapid and easy is the shift from simple διήγησις to μίμησις that the narrator is obscured in the background, and we see only the moving, living pictures before us — a true drama [illegible] the imaginary [illegible]. A most excellent example is furnished in the famous twenty-second book of the Iliad; the book in which the story reaches its culmination and where the art is supreme. In this the scene shifts rapidly: now our attention is directed to Achilles on the Trojan plain, now to Hector [illegible] the Scaean gates, now again to Achilles as he comes rushing on; now off to Olympus, then back to

Achilles and Hector, and now to the lamenting throng upon the wall of Troy. In this description we are [illegible] we occupy an eminence on the field or are ourselves [illegible] narrator as guide.

The most prominent feature in the narrative of Homer is [illegible]. It is [illegible] not simply in diction [illegible] in thought [illegible] in conception as well. Idealization is the true essence of poetry, but in Homer [illegible][1] [illegible] so his narration is an idealization in conception — a true 'mirror of the universe'. But, though the narration is [illegible] it would be [illegible] without an artistic distribution of interest. As the gentle swell is more beautiful than the level sea, so the narration is relieved by the concentration of interest at critical points. This Homer secures

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[1] Jebb's Homer p. 26. Aristotle (περὶ ποιητικῆς, ch. 24) praises his [illegible] use of the supernatural element.

first by his use of similes. A comparison necessarily involves time and this Homer seizes to mark emphatically some critical moment — some moment of intense feeling or action on which he wishes to lay particular stress.[1]

Besides this the simile also serves a [illegible] function, causing a suspension of the action. In this way the full emotional effect of the situation is brought out, good illustrations of which may be seen in Il. X. 297 and 365, and in many other places.

Enumeration of details, since it causes us to linger longer on the description necessarily emphasizes it. This is one of the most effective ways all narrative process of giving emphasis and [illegible], and Homer shades off at times even the minutest detail. A good example of how he makes this serve his purpose may be seen in Iliad X, 395, a short passage, but one which accomplishes its purpose by graphic touches.

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[1] Jebb: Homer p 26-27.

Lyric. All that has been said of epic poetry with regard to the emphasis in minuteness of detail may be applied with equal force to lyric narrative, yet it by no means follows that the lyric poet tells his story in an epic manner. True, he is not less objective than the epic poet, but he attacks his problem in a different way. Indeed we should [illegible] that [illegible] remember that lyric poetry was to be sung, not [illegible] lyric poet does not aim to give a clear and connected story, yet he supplies the gaps by the charm of his music, and we forgive him. His narrative is elliptical and allusive giving rather the κεφαλ[illegible] λόγων[1] than a continuous account; as he passes [illegible] here and another there, [illegible]

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[1] Pindar: Pythia IV. 116.

for the hearer himself to fill out. Another point in which the lyric differs from the epic poet is the way in which he enters into his narrative. First with a few broad strokes he gives the general outline of his story and afterwards one by one he paints in the details. This may be shown from many of the Odes of Pindar — and on Pindar we are dependent for lyrical narrative — but most suited to our purpose is Pythia IV., since, besides being a fairly long continuous narration in lyric form, we have in it lyric treatment of epic theme. In this the prophecy of Medeia (l. 10–56) is indeed a true index of the story which is to follow; but not until 70–71 does he give definitely the outline of his narrative. τίς (γὰρ) ἀρχὰ δέξατο ναυτιλίας; and τίς (δὲ) κίνδυνος κρατεροῖς ἀδαμαντος δῆσεν ἅλοις; are the two headings of his story and he proceeds immediately to amplify them. The details are painted in graphically and with much minuteness(1), the descripti

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1). See the short description of one of the works of Jason, ll. 232 – 236.

are vivid and real, but the figures do not move as in Homer, since our lyric bard does not try to [illegible]. Yet Pindar can do so with effect(1), but he chooses rather to bound lightly from point to point, and [illegible] hesitate to hurry rapidly to the end.

Drama. [illegible] we pass from the region of song to the sphere of action. The dramatic narration is a stirring narrative and in many [illegible] shows a certain mastery. Take, for example, the description of the chariot race in the Electra(2) of Sophocles [illegible] with [illegible] Iliad(3). The description of Sophocles is compact, vivid, real — the words [illegible]

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1) A very good example is lines 86–119 where a description of Jason is given through the eyes of the crowd.

2) Lines 680–763

3) Ψ. 262–650.

[illegible]

through the senses of the messenger alone, and, though we are carried in imagination to the scene of action, it is only in imagination. In the epic description we are among those who enact the scene — we see the start, the dust along the plain, hear the voices of the drivers, and at the end watch the victors carry away the prizes. The dramatic narrative is [illegible] exact in its details, graphic in its portraiture and imbued with life through a by-play of sentiment and feeling. The narrator is usually an eye-witness, or perhaps a participant in [illegible] and either directly or by implication weaves into his story his own feelings and impressions together with those of others. These narratives or ῥήσεις ἀγγελικαί, by which the out-lying parts of a drama are given, hold a prominent place in the dramatic economy of tragedie. [illegible] them with effect and the "Persians" shows the prominence

it had from earliest times. Owing to the restrictions of the attic stage the employment of such narrative is clearly as back-ground and side-lights to bring out the full effect of the thoughts and impulses of the play. Thus in the "Persians" of Aeschylus the scene is the Persian capitol, the back-ground is Hellas. As a rule the messenger's narrative concerns the events of the catastrophe though sometimes the earlier part of the action.(1) Worthy of note is the frequent anticipation in dramatic narrative; as a rule the end is known before the story begins, for the messenger must first deliver his message, tell his news, and then more leisurely recount the details. So in the "Persians" the messenger first briefly states the facts[2] but later, in reply to Atossa, gives detail after item; in the Iphigenia the herdsman comes in fast and running [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to tell of their recent capture.(3) This anticipation is

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1) Flagg: Euripides Iphigenia, Introduction p. [illegible].
2) Line 302 f.
3) Iph. in Taur. l. 260 f.

very different from lyric anticipation, and is such as the nature of the situation demands. This rapid, stirring narration is a strongly marked epic feature in the drama, which by its use in presenting the distant motives of the play, preserves the unity of the action and concentrates the attention on the central thought(1).

History. We now come to history, and here first of all we encounter a vast difference between this and the other great departments just mentioned — the difference between poetry and prose. Though it is quite true that verse is not essential to poetry, history can never be poetic since it must deal with fact as fact, while poetry, ideal in its very nature, is a representation of the ideal — of the eternal in beauty and form. Or as Aristotle says(2) the historian speaks of things that have happened, while the poet speaks of such as might have happened; and he correctly considers poetry more philosophic than

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1) Flagg: **Eurip.** Iphig.a (in T.) Introduction p. 20.
2) Περὶ Ποιητικῆς ch. 9.

[illegible]

particulars. In describing historical scenes the poet does not aim to give the exact details, but he idealizes – he gives the atmosphere, which is after all a truer portrait than the soulless photograph. For historical style we base our estimate on Thucydides. History is the prose representative of epic, and in narrative the type is given by the epos, though something is also added from the drama. Like epic, history divides itself into two parts – narrative and speeches. The speech is generally connected with the narrative and serves to vivify as well as convey the deeper meaning of a period. It is frequently, as in epic, used to bring out the moral effect of the situation, emphasizing some point [illegible] in the situation. The description of the attack on Pylus furnishes a good illustration of this point,(1) and the same may be said of nearly all those speeches which are termed

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(1) Th. c. IV. [illegible]

'military harangues'. Since Thucydides aimed at truthfulness and impartiality in his narrative, he must of necessity free it from his own thoughts, impressions, and feelings; these he expressed through the employment of direct speech — a manner which "formed the most effective mode of presentation in the Epic poetry of Homer, and reached its highest freedom and completeness in the attic drama".(1)

History and Epic narration have many points in common, but Thucydides does not anticipate his story; he lets it gradually unfold itself from day to day, from event to event, without any artificial arrangement or adornment. Like Epic, history proceeds not by an uniform narrative but by a series of descriptions; and these descriptions are vigorous and lucid. If we look at the stirring narrative of the affair of Pylos(2), the impressiveness of the departure of the Sicilian expedition(3), and

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[illegible] LXXI

1. (C. E. Morris; Thucydides Book I. Introd. p.42. 2) IV. 3-14

3) VI. 30-32. For other examples see Morris, p39 (Introd.)

which is a translation of [illegible] LXXI.

the minute description of the plague(1), we seem to be eye-witnesses of the scene, as one by one the facts in regular succession fall upon us loaded with all the gravity and excitement of the occasion. The delineations are clear, vivid, stirring – vivid because they are clear, stirring because the [illegible] stirring.

In delineation of character Thucydides is dramatic. Few and brief are the descriptions he gives us of the men who were prominent in making the history of his day. He lets us form our own opinion of them from their acts and their speeches. Yet though he seldom favors us with a definite [illegible], we [illegible] help forming an estimate of the skill, the capacity, the motives of those who were engaged in them. Sometimes [illegible] if we were contemporaries.

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1) II. 48-53

Oratory. For oratory narration is a [illegible] important element, and may be made as effective as the argument itself. The length of the narration, or even whether it shall be used at all,(1) [illegible] the nature of the speech and also upon the circumstances under which it was delivered. In narration the orator may rise to eloquence, but never to poetry, since as an advocate his genius [illegible] in making the most of a single idea. He differs from the historian in that his narrative [illegible] make a point; he is at liberty to select and arrange his facts, suppressing the weak, making prominent the strong, and yet give to the whole an air of completeness. The narrative is usually itself a point, that is it seeks to prejudice you either for or against — a characteristic which [illegible] eminently true of the narratives of Lysias and answerable to a marked [illegible].

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1) See Volkmann: Die Rhetorik der Gr. u. Röm. S. 149.

Besides this, however, the restriction as to time does not allow everything to be given. As the speech is [illegible] [illegible] and narrative are one and cannot be separated; or they may run along side by side, the διήγησις being interwoven point by point with the πίστις. Demosthenes is especially fond of this style of narrative, and the [illegible] especially when it is long and the points not easily reverted to. The pattern or basis of oratorical [illegible] in history. For example, Andocides, who expends [illegible] make it as stirring, as vivid as possible. He is [illegible] and employs direct speech to bring out the finer shades of feeling and pathos. Even the truthful simplicity of Lysias is not a real simplicity, but

an artful simplicity; yet so natural is it that we do not suspect him of telling anything but 'the truth and [illegible] truth'.

Lucian. Before passing to our consideration of philosophical narrative, we must pause for a brief glance at Lucian, who in certain phases of his art reflects the art of Plato. If we glance at the 'True Story' we find at once a narrative straight-forward, clear, and vivid, but fanciful. Event follows event in a way that is as natural as the most realistic narratives of Thucydides; and everywhere there is a play of imagination worthy of the most fanciful moods of Plato. The descriptions are natural and vigorous. As it were, he thinks in pictures, which are for him real existences rather than mere abstractions. His narrative is a combination of history and the drama — it is spirited narrative of the facts of fancy; and [illegible] large admixture of the comic element.(1)

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(1) Croiset (Vie et Oeuvres de L. p. 317) says the [illegible] or [illegible] is a real comedy under narrative form.

The Mythe as Narrative

Having taken a glance at other forms of narrative we come now to the main subject of this essay philosophical narrative, or the mythe; and naturally our attention is first drawn to the similarity or difference in the two [illegible] indicated. History need not concern us here since the sphere of narrative in history and in philosophy is so entirely different: one deals with ascertained fact, the other with unascertainable fact or with conceptions that are beyond the range of human knowledge and experience. Yet after all the difference is more largely a matter of methods than of kind. The basis of the philosophical narrative is epic, yet it does not like history simply tell something. He has in view an attempt at discovering truth, of finding suitable expression for an abstract conception or a religious feeling — it is the embodiment of an abstract [illegible] in physical form in

concrete form. Like epic the philosophical narrative is a leisurely narrative rather than rapid and stirring, yet it does not lack a considerable amount of vivacity and vigor. In this it resembles largely the drama. That Plato, who is so dramatic in other respects, should also be dramatic in his narratives, is a thing most natural to suppose. That he does make large use of the drama can be seen in all the myths, especially in his fondness for dramatic situations(1) and for introducing into his story persons speaking(2). At times the narrative may even become stirring though usually it is leisurely and explanatory. There is, of course no room for lyric anticipation since in its very nature the myth is spontaneous, its thought and its form springing into being together. Yet lyric influence can be seen especially in the Phaedrus(3) where Socrates confesses himself to be in a dithyrambic mood. In the Republic, the speech

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1) Cf. [illegible] E [illegible]. 2) See below page 5[illegible]

3) 246E, 247A, 247E, 248C, 252C.

of the προφήτης[1] is peculiarly lyric in its brevity, and has the rhythmic flow of a religious formula. Other myths show here and there a lyric touch and particularly is this true of the Timaeus.[2]

The myth has something in common with the oratorical narrative in that it seeks to persuade; and it brings such evidence as it can to support the point made. But the fundamental facts are only the poetic facts which are vividly imagined as truth.[3] Novák[4] has shown the practical relation of these myths to Plato's rhetorical art, for in these Plato's rhetorical art shines forth clearest. Though the object of these narratives is to persuade as well as instruct, the facts are not marshalled as by an orator but unfold themselves in pictures. Plato thinks in pictures and these images are as necessary for an expression of his poetic soul as words and phrases are for more prosaic minds. Not unfre-

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[1] Rep. X. 617 D.E.

[2] Campbell: Soph. and Polit. Introdn. p. XL.

[3] Phaedo 114 D.

[4] Platon u. die Rhetorik s. 500 f.

frequently has the narrator paused in the narration to point a moral, explain something which the story suggests, or even combat an idea that may be misleading(1). Thus far there is an analogy with oratory, but in the moral purpose and its accompanying form, the allegorical element, Plato is unique. Indeed these are distinctive features of the philosophic narrative and serve as a differentiation from all others. In oratory everything makes for effect, in philosophy everything for the moral purpose. In Plato we see not simply the artist, the philosopher, but likewise the moral reformer,(2) as is seen in the Menexenus: he "rewrites the typical Athenian funeral oration and charges it with moral meanings of his own".(3) Whatever else we may gain from a Platonic dialogue we can see the purpose of the ethical suggestions of his language. [illegible] purpose, the constant reaching after the beauty of moral perfection, which

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1) Phaedo 108A. 2) Prof. Shorey: American Journal of Phil. V. X. p. 398 3. Ib. p. 406.

gives to the myths their truly poetical character. They present to our view those ideal forms of excellence which are a poet's delight and which have a beauty to satisfy a moral nature.

In the allegorical element we have a second feature which serves to differentiate [illegible] from other narratives. In [illegible], as for example Phaedrus 246 A f. and Symposium 203 A.f, the allegorical element is very apparent, Plato himself explaining the symbolism in the first example. In others[1] the allegorical element is more subtle, yet here and there something will show itself to remind us that the story has [illegible] meaning. Sometimes it seems to be nothing but feeling, for when we start to analyse it eludes our grasp. It is their mysteriousness, their unstrained parallelism [illegible] come to the mind [illegible] which [illegible] to [illegible] the allegorical [illegible] [illegible].

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[1] e.g. Rep 514 B. Politicus 26 . C.f.

Dramatic Propriety. Under this head may be included two features: First, what might more properly be called Êthopoiïa, the adaptation of the story to the person who utters it, and second the adaptation of the story to the circumstances, to the tone and spirit of the particular dialogue. So in the Phaedrus when a transition is to be made from the grandeur and sublimity of the 'palinode' to the [illegible] latter part [illegible], the story of the Cicadas (259 A.f.) furnishes the dramatic motive for a continuation of the research.[1]

In the Protagoras (320 C.) the myth is put in the mouth of a sophist[2] and is fashioned in a manner to represent the style of the sophists. It is given in the conventional archaic form and readily suggests an attempt on the part of the speaker to be 'fine'. As a part of the dialogue it conveys an idea which is to be refuted.

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[1] Thompson: Phaedrus. note ad loc.

[2] Zeller (Phil. d. Gr. I' 580 note) and some others think this myth may have been drawn from the writings of Protag., but see Sauppe's Protag. Einleitung S.1[illegible]

or at least, not fully accepted. Similarly Aristophanes in the Symposium (189 D.) is made to show his genius as a comedian, though his hypothesis is afterwards [illegible]. The [illegible] tells what he had heard about the glories of the [illegible] (211 A.), [illegible] must discourse on the wonders of creation. On account of this dramatic propriety we fail to find consistency in the myths, not simply in the lesser matters of description and detail, but even in matters more important. Thus the Gorgias, which had as its thesis that true happiness was not a matter of power but of the soul,(1) has no mention of the 'wings' of the [illegible] nor [illegible]' of the [illegible]; nor [illegible] other hand, has the Phaedrus any mention of the 'judgment of the dead' nor the Symposium any future life of the soul. We have no creation in the Phaedo, little retribution in the Timaeus. From a

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1) Teichmüller: Die Platonische Frage S. 95.

philosophical point of view the myths cannot be reconciled, but when we consider the moral purpose of these stories and their conformity to the question in hand, all of the discrepancies are easily accounted for. The moral as well as the dramatic purpose can be readily seen from Republic 612 B. where Socrates, having [illegible] that justice is best for the soul, proceeds with this as an apology to dwell on the subject of rewards. In the Gorgias, having a different audience before him, he makes no such apology, but, after showing that true happiness is a matter of the soul, he further impresses the point by the narrative which follows.

Humor. Irony and humor are subtle and may be found where they were never intended, but in many of our narratives beneath the solemn, matter-of-fact exterior, we cannot fail to see at times Plato's usual vein of humor and Socratic irony. Aristophanes' story in the Symposium is more comical [illegible]

earnest, though dithyrambic, Socrates declares that he
"[illegible]
truth" (247 C.); or when he quotes the apocryphal Homer,
we feel there must have been a covert smile. In
the Republic (III. 414 C.) we have a display of Socratic
modesty. Here Socrates professes himself ashamed to
tell an old 'Phoenician lie', and the humor is still furth
heightened by the remark of Glaucon after hearing a
portion of the tale. Plato himself declares it was
laughable as well as pitiable (Rep. X. 620 A) to behold the
souls making their choice of lives; and he must wit
[illegible]
forms of the earth-born race (Polit. 271 f). When Neo-So
[illegible]
fact "all that you say seems extremely probable", and
when Socrates (Tim. 26 E) declares that the best thing about
the story which Critias was so particular to call to mind
exactly, is its truthfulness, we are obliged to concede
[illegible]

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(1) C [illegible]

Rhetorical Tests. [illegible] oratorical test to our mythical narrations, the effort is to get a clearer idea of their scope and limitations by trying to see wherein they diverge from the oratorical standard and wherein they coincide, and if they fall short, to what extent.

The three essential properties of narrative as given by the grammarians are that it shall be σαφής, σύντομος, and πιθανή.[1] This statement is of course, based on models drawn from practical or forensic oratory, yet to a certain extent these same properties must characterize all forms of narrative, if they are to be artistic and effective.

The first requisite, then, is that the narrative shall be clear, σαφής. This clearness is dependent upon the contents and the form: the contents are to be given in the order of the circumstances and the time, that nothing may be left out or repeated;

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[1] Volkmann: Rhetorik der Gr. u. Röm. S. 153.

the form is to be appropriate, avoiding all unusual expressions, forced positions, long periods and whatever else will render the language obscure.

In comparing the narratives of Plato with the models of attic prose we find a very perceptible difference in respect to some of the points just mentioned. First, in regard to the contents, Plato accords perfectly with the law laid down in that everything is given in the order in which it would naturally occur. This is, indeed, one of the features which is brought out in studying the myths as well.

Yet this must be taken with some modification, for Plato is not always perfectly clear as to the consistency of every detail. Having some general purpose in view, he does not care to clarify some of the minor details from the confusing mysticism which surrounds them. Republic X.614C., 616C., Phaedo 112 D., and several places in the Phaedrus will furnish instances of this. The topography of the

places here described it seems impossible to picture definitely, and some think even consistently with the rest of the story. But the myth deals mainly with things beyond the range of human experience so we must not [illegible] [illegible] other [illegible] [illegible].

In language Plato is in keeping with the elevated and [illegible] imaginative character of the narration. He did not choose to avoid all unusual words and expressions, but uses poetical [illegible] [illegible], e.g. [illegible] Phr. 252 C., [illegible] 254 E., ἐπίπροσθεν Gorg. 523 D., τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα Rep. X. 620 E., γῆς ἔνδον Protag. 320 D.(1) &c. He did not sacrifice emphasis [illegible] rhythm [illegible] [illegible].(2) Sometimes his sentences are involved (Phaedo 108 D., Polit. 271 C., Gorg. 523 B.), nor is he too particular about a [illegible]

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1) The Protag. myth is full of such poetical expressions. [illegible] C.

2) See below page [illegible]

anacoluth (Rep. X. 614 C. Phr. 249 D.) In examining these, [illegible] language though conversational in form, while the words of the orator were addressed to the ear and [illegible] reason and because of the figurative and poetic [illegible] of Plato the same plainness and simplicity that is characteristic of Lysias[1].

Conciseness. [illegible] concise, (σύντομος) is wholly relative; and to the statement that it must be rapid, Aristotle[2] takes [illegible] for the purpose is to be said, and no more. Thus conciseness in oratory is one thing, and in history quite another. The orator gives nothing irrelevant, but the

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[1] Compare Shorey: Am. Jour. Phil. vol IX. p 409.

[2] Rhetoric III. 16, 4.

historian must tell all, both the relevant and irrelevant if he is really giving history. In philosophy the myths grow out of the situation and so have nothing irrelevant. Every detail is a necessary part of the picture, and though we cannot call Plato's narratives prolix, they however, have not the usual rhetorical terseness and brevity. In the leisurely narratives of Plato the sentences are looser in structure and often drawn out to a greater length than in oratory or even in history. This freedom in his periods is due to several causes: digressions and explanations (Rep. X. 615 A, 618 BC, Symp. 203 B, Phr. 250 D), descriptions (Rep. X. 616 D f., Phr. 274 C, Phaedo 111 C, f. etc), the many comparisons, various grammatical constructions such as epexegesis (Phr. 253 B, Polit. 274 D) or a succession of participles with others depending on them (Rep. X. 616 D f.) — all of which tend to retard the rapid flow of the sentence to the end. The forensic art of the orator prefers the [illegible] rapid course, but the art of Plato allowed him to

hasten rapidly or lingering to further amplify and explain as suited his mood and purpose. When he digresses, it is to explain a difficulty or point a moral — just as though an orator should stop in his narrative to clinch a point.

Another cause of fulness in Plato is the frequent accumulation of words either for explanation, for emphasis or for symmetry and elegance. With regard [illegible] single word, you detract from it.(1) Thus, giving a kind of ὄγκος quite in keeping with the magnificence of the Phaedrus, is the pleonasm in πρὸς δαῖτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνην (247 B), ῥέπων τε καὶ βαρύνων (ib.), μακαρίαν ὄψιν τε καὶ θέαν (250 B). Somewhat similar is τὴν ἰσχὺν ... καὶ τὴν ῥώμην (Symp. 190 B), ἐγέννων καὶ ἔτικτον (ib. 191 B). Fulness of this sort is not uncommon in Plato: βίᾳ καὶ μόγις (Phaedo 108 B), φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται (ib.), πυθμένα ... βάσιν (ib. 112 B), ὀδυρομένα,

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1). See Gellius II. v. and cf. Jebb: Att. Or. vol. 1 p. 172 note.

τε καὶ κλαιούσας (Rep. X. 614E), ζητὴς καὶ μαθητής (ib. 618C).

Interesting is ἐπὶ κλήρωσίν τε καὶ αἵρεσιν (Phr. 249B)[1]; ἀκόλουθος καὶ θεράπων (Symp. 203C). Sometimes both sides are present [illegible] ἡ ... φύσις οὐχ αὕτη ἦν --- ἀλλ' ἀλλοία (Symp. 189D), ἀγαπητός οὐ κακός (Rep. X 619B), μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο (ib. 621C). We know what an important factor in the style of Demosthenes is this use of two synonymous words, by which dwelling longer on a thought, he emphasizes it, and thus gains more in vigor than he loses in conciseness. Quite different is the occasional use of a genitive or participle redundantly as in Politicus 270E and 271E.[2]

Periphrasis is also a source of fulness of expression, [illegible] and that it should be common in so reflective an author as Plato is not surprising. Besides the more usual periphrases with εἰμί the following

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[1] Compare οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε Rep. X. 617E.

[2] Campbell: Soph. & Polit. Introd. XXXVI.

may be mentioned: ὕβρει προσομιλῶν (Phr. 251 A), ἐραστὴς ὤν (Symp. 203 C), μίμημα ἔχουσα (Laws IV. 713 B). The frequent occurrence of the σχῆμα ἐτυμολογικόν also adds to the fulness of Plato, but this is a common phenomenon throughout Greek literature. From the [illegible] that [illegible] features [illegible], [illegible] ance to brevity and rapidity. Yet Plato does not seek [illegible] the story appear shorter. A favorite manner is to warn his hearers that the tale is a little long (Symp. 203 A, Critias 113 B) nevertheless [illegible] putting [illegible] information is as briefly as possible. [illegible] professes to give simply the sum (Rep. X. 615 A), or casting all minor details aside to proceed to the main question (Phr. [illegible] E). This [illegible] the [illegible] cal ἵνα συντέμνω and similar expressions by which [illegible] though in reality he may not be.

Plausibility. The third essential of a narrative is

that it shall be plausible ([illegible]). In [illegible] any-thing not in accordance with the nature of the narrative must be rejected, or if seemingly strange, it must be explained. Thus Critias pauses in his story to tell us why [illegible] the meaning of proper names given to foreigners (Crit. 113A), and in beginning (Tim. 21A f.) this wonderful story of Atlantis he is very particular to show how it reached his ears and how it was preserved from destruction in hoary antiquity.

Like every true artist, our narrator wishes to make his fictions as natural and lifelike as possible, and we can frequently see what means he uses to accomplish this. The first thing which presents itself is his assertion of the truth of what he narrates. Even the [illegible] cannot refrain from declaring the 'truth about truth' (Phr. 247C), in the Gorgias (523A) the story is not a μῦθος but a λόγος, and the 'Vision of Er' (Rep. X. 614B) is the tale of a brave man. Critias (Tim. 26 A f.) speaks most [illegible]

the afternoon and night in fixing clearly in his mind a story he had heard while a youth — a story for the truth of which Socrates afterwards vouches (Tim. 25E). Into the second part of this narrative [illegible]

[illegible] follows he has to confess that the size of the ditch is incredible, still he 'must tell the tale as he heard it' (Crit. 118C).

In addition to this, more subtle touches in the details themselves add greatly to the truthfulness of the narrative. The incidental reference to the behavior of the soul that made an ill choice (Rep. X. 619C), and the precision with which the soul that chose the twentieth lot (ib. 620 AC) is mentioned, may be taken as illustrations of this point. Even in so fantastic a story as that of Aristophanes in the Symposium, we may notice the plausibility of the third sex (189E); the reason why there

were three sexes (190B); their insolence and why they were not destroyed (190C); the council, the plan of Zeus and its execution (190E) – the evidence of which is seen in the navel and wrinkles about the belly. Similarly in the Politicus interpretations of ancient traditions are produced to support the historic truth of the story, and in the Timaeus (25CD) the sinking of Atlantis is naturally made to account for the shallowness of the sea beyond the Pillars of Heracles. In fact the whole story of Atlantis is clothed with the utmost probability and so real is it that many cannot believe it existed only in Plato's imagination.(1)

A further source of probability is found in the basis of the myths themselves. Apart from artistic considerations it was perhaps with this in view that he founded his narratives upon the primitive history of his countrymen. "By

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1) Some have maintained that it was actually [illegible] and was nothing less than the garden of Eden.

appealing to the story of Atreus, or Deucalion, or Prometheus for confirmation of some part of his recital, he seemed to bridge the gulf between the known and [illegible]."[1]

Vividness. The [illegible] element in narration is the descriptive power of the narrator, by which he presents accurately and forcibly an object before his hearers so that it may be seen. This power, which is defined by Dionysius[2] as δύναμις ὑπὸ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἄγουσα τὰ λεγόμενα, is called vividness (ἐνάργεια), and it may arise through a judicious use of detail together with a perception of character. We may also have effective word painting as in the Phaedrus 246 E f. The vividness of the myths is dependent more on Plato's attention to details than to any distinct attempt to give character drawing, though he has no lack of delicate and subtle touches. Of this many examples may be furnished; some of the

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1) C[illegible]; Stewart, Myths of Plato p. XIII. 2) De Lys. c. 7.

most striking which we may mention are: the proceeding of souls into the meadow (Rep. X. 614 D f.); the choice of lives (ib. 619 C f.), particularly the choice of the one having the first lot and of Odysseus; the characterization of the good and the bad horse, especially the graphic description of the [illegible] (Phdr. 253 D f.). In this last example we have at once the brilliant coloring of Isocrates and the accurate drawing of Lysias. Here we may notice the asyndeta and the massing of participles which add liveliness to the [illegible]. From the Critias we might mention the primitive Acropolis (112 f.); the wealth of Atlantis (114 E); the oaths of the kings (120 f.). Similarly other examples might be cited from these and other myths, if necessary, but these are sufficient to illustrate Plato's power of handling details. Indeed, this wealth and naturalness of detail is one of the most pleasing features of the myth. It gives to the imaginary picture a completeness and

reality [illegible] to general effects.

[illegible] speaking; and from the requirements of the case these were usually gods or some spiritual being. This same fondness for dramatising his [illegible], and this element is also skilfully used by Lysias and Demosthenes to heighten the pathos. In addition to this it lends variety to a speech and relieves the attention. Since in the myths there are no opponents to be combated some of the more effective forms of this προσωποποιία are wanting. Here the words are always put into the mouth of some real person, whether it be man, god or spirit, and they are often given in a dignified tone. The examples are: the request of Epimetheus (Protag. 320 D); the reply of

Zeus to Pluto and the overseers of the Blessed Isles (Gorg. 523C to end of myth); Zeus tells his plan (Symp. 190C–D).

In the Republic (III. 415A) the story which Socrates has been telling passes, by an easy change, over [illegible] the direct, as though he were talking to the [illegible] of his ideal state. More formal and dignified than the above is the speech of the προφήτης (Rep. X. 617D and 619B); the address of the Demiurgus (Tim. 41A–D); and the Critias ends just as Zeus is about to speak.

[illegible]

amounting only to question and answer: Theuth and Thamus (Phdr. 274E–275B); Zeus and Hermes (Protag. 322C–D); the elder Critias and the clansman (Tim. 21C ff.); Solon and the priest (ib. 22B). In the Republic (X. 615D–616A) we have a direct reply to a question in a story. [illegible] in the [illegible] of another introduced into the speech.

Some Special Points

Comparisons. The myth is itself an extended metaphor and, when the figure is once chosen, it becomes an essential part of the narrative. Besides this we also find frequent similes, which are, however, introduced not merely for the purpose of ornament, but for clearness and vividness as well. This is shown by their abundance when Socrates describes [illegible] other world (Phaed. 107 D f.) and particularly when Aristophanes undertakes to explain this wonderful phenomenon (Symp. 190 D). In this latter example we have at least six similes within the compass of 2½ pages (Teubn.), a fact which becomes significant when we remember that comparisons, though frequent in Homer, are seldom in the orators(1) and even comparatively few in Pindar. This is but another proof of the originality of Plato who was to be bound by nothing

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1) "in den Rednern nicht allzu häufig" Volkmann: Rhet. S. 444.

except the laws of his own poetic mind. In Homer under the glow of poetical energy the comparison is to introduce something which is rendered especially impressive(1); in the myth it is used, as in Demosthenes(2), rather for clearness yet of necessity it does add vividness to the narration and gives intensity to the thought. When Plato compares the windings of the infernal streams to serpents (Phaed. 112 D), the column of light to the under-girders of a trireme (Rep. X. 616 C), the union of soul and body to an oyster in his shell (Phr. 250 C), and the torrent from heaven to a recurring disease (Tim. 23 A), his aim is at clearness — to explain the unknown by the known. The same is still more true of Phaed. 109 E; Rep. X. 616 D, Polit. 271 E, Laws IV. 713 D. Yet, when we see the charioteer of the winged steeds fall back like racers at the barrier (Phr. 254 E), or the souls at midnight shoot to the birth like stars

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1) Jebb: Homer p. 27. 2) Rehdantz: Index s.v. Gleichnis.

(Rep. X. 621 B), [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

is the figure of the bird (Phr. 249E) and the Bacchic woman (ib. 253A). The comparisons in [illegible] by [illegible]. In all there are more than forty [illegible] are in the whole of the Odyssey - and drawn from a great variety of sources.

[illegible]. [illegible] us that if human speech was in vogue among [illegible] ing the majestic dignity and eloquence of Plato. Plato's style exhibits in the highest degree those rhythmical changes, and that variety and elegance of figures which are so important in the [illegible] of style.[2] Moreover, Dionysius[3] after

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[1] De admir. vi in Dem. c. 23.

[2] De comp. verb. [illegible]

[3] De comp. verb. c. 16.

[illegible]

εγε: "μυρία τοιαῦτά ἐστι παρὰ Πλάτωνι. ὁ γὰρ ἀνὴρ εὐμέλειάν τε καὶ εὐρυθμίαν συνιδεῖν δαιμονιώτατος";

[illegible]

(ἔστι;) in the selection as in the composition of his words, he might have emphasized. Sometimes, or

[illegible]

As an example of this excellence in Plato we may take a few sentences from a myth where the rhythm is fresh and vigorous; for the Platonic Socrates having just emerged from his dithyrambic mood his spirit is perhaps still conscious of his power. We will take a few sentences from the Phaedr. (246 E) ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν etc and we may indicate the

1. — ∪ ⁝ — —, ∪ ∪ ∪, ∪ —, ∪ —, ∪ —, $\bar{\wedge}$

b. ∪ — | — — | ∪ — | ∪ — — | ∪ — | ∪ —

c. ∪ ∪ — | — — | ∪ — | ∪ ∪ ∪ — | ∪ —

2. a. — ∪ ∪ | — ∪ ∪ | — 7 | — ∪ —, — ∪ —

b. ∪ ∪ —, ∪ ∪ ∪ — | ∪ — — ∪ —

3. ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ – – – ⏑ –

In 1a. we have an approach to an iambic line; b. ends in an iambic monometer preceded by a bacchius; and c. has an anapaestic movement. 2 a. opens with dactyls, then a foot which we may consider either a trochee or irrational, and ends with a cretic dipody. In b we may find an anapaest, a paeon and at the end a dochmius. This is a favorite ending with Plato[1]: e.g. ἐτῶν μυρίων (Phr. 248 E), and frequently terminating with – [illegible] as in (ἐ)βίωσαν βίου (Phr. 249 B). 3 may be considered an iambic trimeter. Some of the sentences which follow the above do not [illegible] so much regularity yet in all there is a goodly mixture of heavy and light syllables.

Of course other feet could have been adduced as well as the ones given above, yet it is hoped

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[1] Compare [illegible] p. XLI.

by thus showing the rhythmical intermingling of long and short syllables, that the opinion of Dionysius is reinforced and confirmed in part at least. The appreciation of the rhythm of an author is largely a matter of individual taste and experience, still one could hardly fail to see a certain grandeur and richness in the opening of this myth in the Phaedrus, or a certain solemnity in the speech of the προφήτης, (Rep. X, 617 A) ψυχαὶ ἐφήμεροι ----- θᾰνᾰτη̄φŏρŏῡ κτ. A portion of this speech is an approach to an iambic line and [illegible] a stately dignity about the address of the Demiurgus (Tim. 41A), and the pathos and exaltation of the close of the Republic (621 C) would be hard to parallel. Campbell(1) has shown that Plato had an increasing fondness for dithyrambic and tragic cadences, which in the Timaeus and Laws occur almost perpetually.

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1) Soph. and Polit. Introd. ([illegible]) p. XL

Hyperbaton is one of the most important elements [illegible] this rhythm, as we can see by the frequent transpositions, inversions and alternations occurring in the myths. In this way the author regulates the words of his sentence with regard to sound or emphasis, and he can express [illegible] the [illegible] of his thought by making one expression catch up another. In this [illegible] we can [illegible] perceive Plato's purpose: to secure emphasis by throwing a word to the head or end of a sentence, to bring [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. This is true especially of the Politicus, Timaeus, Critias and Laws.(1) To show the extent and great variety of hyperbaton in the myths some examples will be given.

Particles affected by hyperbaton: περί (Phaed. 112E, Rep. X 615C [illegible] 49E), ἄν [illegible] 112E), ἄν [illegible]

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1) Blass: Att. Beredsam. 2te Abteil. S. 426

(Tim. 26 B). Noteworthy is ἕνεκα in παιδιᾶς τε ὅς ἕνεκα (Crit. 115 B) where the relative is distracting as well as displaced.

Adverbs affected by hyperbaton: πρῶτον (Phaed. 113 B), εἰκότως (Rep. III. 415 A), ἱκανῶς (Crit. 114 E).

[illegible] rather than displaced as for example ἐκ (Phaed. 110 C), περί (Polit. 271 E), ἐν (Crit. 115 C), but this is due to [illegible] hardly [illegible] color.

Frequent is the hyperbaton of nouns: δειμάτων (Phr. 251 A), χρόνου (Polit. 269 C), τροπή (ib. 270 D); or a genitive is far removed from its limiting word: τίς .... τῶν ἐνθάδε (Phr. 259 C), γένεσις --- ζώων (Polit. 271 A).

Frequently an adjective is separated from its noun: τοῦτο δέ, ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὸ μάθημα (Phr. 274 E), ἄλλα --- θαυμαστά (Rep. II. 359 D). More familiar is the type ὡς τόδε ἕξει τὸ σχῆμα (Phr. 249 B), πάσας ἐπιστρέφεσθαι τὰς περιφοράς (Rep. X. 616 C) &c, — a type very common in Plato and [illegible]

To be noted are grammatical governments intermingled by hyperbaton: βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς κάκης ἵππος μετέχων (Phr. 247 B). Here we can see how in the rapidity of the sentence one thought runs into the other. Similarly also Phr. 249 D, Phaedo 108 C, Rep. X. 618 B, Tim. 50 B.

Sometimes also, owing to the freedom of conversational style and to the exigences of dialogue, clauses are intermingled,(1) as for example in Phaedo 108 D where the narrative is interrupted for a moment.

In Phaedo 114 C we have a clause postponed.

We might also mention the common, though not colorless, form of the antecedent incorporated into the relative sentence, such as οὗ ... ἐβίωσαν βίου (Phr. 249 B) etc.

Selecting examples of these hyperbata, which seem to be sufficiently prominent to give color,

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1) An interesting example of intermingling is seen in Symp. 212 E where Alcibiades tries to carry on two conversations at once.

the myths in the Phaedo, Symposium, Protagoras and Phaedrus[1] appear to average about the same. In the great myth of the Phaedrus (246 A f.) hyperbata are less frequent towards the end, where the tone is half narrative, half argumentative and explanatory, but where the unruly horse is described it increases. The myths in the Republic show an average of a little less than those above, and the Gorgias (523 A f.), which is one of the simplest and less passionate myths, has scarcely a single good example. In the Politicus, Timaeus, Critias and Laws there is a considerable increase over the others, and here also come in frequent inversions or alternations of words, as for example τοῖς ἐντὸς ἡμῖν κ.τ.έ. (Polit. 270C) and πολλῶν μὲν οὖν δὴ κ.τ.έ. (Tim. 21B). Taking an average of hyperbata and such inversions from various parts of the Timaeus, it appears that they are [illegible]

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[1] The story of Theuth (274 C f.) shows a greater proportion than the others, being about one page long and having at least five examples.

frequent in the story told by Timaeus than in the one by Critias. If this may be taken as fairly accurate, it would seem to indicate that Timaeus tried to make up in composition what he lacked in interest of theme.

In his use of hyperbaton Plato resembles Demosthenes, whom Longinus [illegible] πάντων κατακορέστατον in this respect and it is this which [illegible] so much to the rhythm and force of his composition. Yet, what is a source of elegance in Plato's earlier dialogues, becomes by increased frequency affected and artificial and to this in part is due the stiffness of the later dialogues.

Sometimes *alliteration* is joined with the hyperbaton to further heighten the effect as in πολλαὶ δὲ πολλὰ πτερὰ ... πᾶσαι δὲ πολὺν κ.τ.ἑ. (Phr. 248 B); and he not unfrequently makes use of this sensuous element of speech to enhance his rhythm and to hold fast the aroused feeling. Some examples

are: K (Phaedo 109 B), T (Phr. 249C) and frequently the favorite Π (Phr. 253C, Tim. 21 B cf. also Menex. 247A).

Producing a somewhat similar effect is the σχῆμα ἐτυμολογικόν which he uses so abundantly, and he is very fond of throwing similar in sound together, as for example ὄντα ὄντως (Phr. 247E), ἐβίωσαν βίον (ib. 249B), Διὸς Δῖον (ib. 252E) &c.

Participle. Since narrative is the home of the participle, it would not be out of place to examine the myths with reference to this point. As would naturally [illegible] expected, we find the greatest [illegible] its use not only between myth and myth, but also within the compass of a single myth according as our author stops to paint in details or hurries on to draw the moral.

Of the myths examined the story of Prometheus and Epimetheus (Protag. 320C f.) shows the lowest percentage of participles (22 per cent), and may be called fairly araiometochic. Protagoras tells his

story in a straight forward, old fashioned manner. The tale of Aristophanes (Symp. 189C) has 26 per cent; a smaller proportion of participles than we might expect for so fantastical a story, but they are kept down by its didactic tone. For the whole Diotima's tale (Symp. 203A) is oligometochic (30 per cent). Though at first participles and verbs run side by side, the logical character of the end gives the supremacy to the verb. The myths in the Phaedo (107D) and [illegible] (523A), are oligometochic ([illegible] per cent) [illegible] participles [illegible]. In the Timaeus[1] the story of Critias starts with a sparing use of the participle, while the occasional interposition of [illegible] ἦ δ' ὅς [illegible] the [illegible],

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[1] Prof Shorey (A.J.P. Vol. 9 p.403 note) says: "The Tim. is polymetochic & [illegible] I can trust a hasty count, offers more participles to the pa [illegible] [illegible] often maintains as high an average for [illegible] pages".

but as the speaker warms in his subject, the participles increase to equal proportions with the verbs, bringing up the average for the whole. In the Republic (X 614 B) the myth is fairly eumetochic (38 per cent), with occasionally polymetochic (e.g. 620, A–D). The nice grouping of verbs and participles in the opening sentence, ὅς ποτε κ.τ.ἑ., is especially noteworthy. The myth in the Phaedrus (246 A f.) shows the greatest amount of color. It is polymetochic (42 per cent), though in some places it is oligometochic or even araiometochic (e.g. 252 C–E). But especially to be noted is the massing of participles in turbulent passages,[1] and no better example can be given than the bounding and plunging of the unruly horse (254 B–E). Here there are twice as many participles as verbs — (29 partic., 15 vbs). Plato knew well how to give color when the occasion demanded and how to pin down an argument with the finite verb.

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[1] cf. [illegible]

Tenses. Very important for narration is the way in which an author handles his tenses — whether with the imperfect he dwells on the course of an event, or with the aorist merely states its occurrence. A narrator's use of the imperfect and aorist is, therefore, a norm of style.[1] Some of the myths (e.g. Gorg. 523 A, Symp. 203 A, Rep. III. 414 D) are given [illegible] e.g. Phr. 246 D, Phaed. 107 D) in the general or aoristic present, and so may be omitted in our consideration of this point. In most of the narratives the percentage of imperfects is quite high, as the style is conversational and leisurely. Besides Plato loved to dwell on the images of his creation, and frequently, as in Rep. X [illegible] im-perfects. The largest proportion of imperfect to aorist (about 6:1) occurs in the Symposium (172 f.) — a story di

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[1] see Prof. Gildersleeve: A.J.P. Vol. IV. p. 161 f.

is highly picturesque. The Politicus (269 ff.) shows the proportion of about 4:1, and also the large use of the imperfect (11:7, about) by Protagoras is evidently due to a desire on the part of that narrator to make his story as vivid and picturesque as possible. This is also shown by his large use of the historical present. Here within the space of about 2½ pages (Jowett) there are not less than seven distinct examples, including ten separate verbs(1). It is a vulgar effort on the part of Protagoras to be fine. Similarly Aris-

[illegible] p. 191 C) [illegible]

narrative by this use(2), and even the sober Socrates (ib. 203A), under the influence of the banquet, does [illegible] hesitate to vivify the tale of Diotima(3).

[illegible] historical [illegible]

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1) τυποῦσι, νέμει (320D), ἔρχεται — ὁρᾷ (321C), κλέπτει — δωρεῖται (ib. CD); εἰσέρχεται — δίδωσι (ib. E), πέμπει, ἐρωτ (322C).

2) λέγει (190C), ποιεῖται — μετατίθησι (191B).

3) κατακλίνεται (203C).

4) λέγει (41A), μηχανῶνται — φυτεύουσι (77A).

natural and perfectly in keeping with the elevated and poetic nature of that work. We would expect to see the historical present in the [illegible] myth of the Phaedrus, but since the story is given in [illegible] present; yet the change from the present to aorist – ἔστησαν, ἦλθον (247 C+E) – and that from aorist to present – ἕλκει (254 D) – are in accord with the elegance and poetical character of the myth.

The Myths

All attempts at grouping the myths [illegible] unsatisfactory because of the manifold variations in substance and form which render classification almost or quite impossible. For the purposes of this dissertation these mythical narrations would naturally divide themselves into two classes — Socratic and Non-Socratic. The term "Socratic" here is intended to include not simply those narratives put in the mouth of Socrates, but all which are given in the [illegible]; and in this sense the term is applicable to the story told by the Stranger in the Politicus, or the Athenian Stranger in the Laws, or Timaeus in the dialogue of the same name.

In the [illegible] of the myths there are only three — Protag. 320C f., Symp. 189 D f., Repub. II 359 D f. — and these may be considered first.

Prometheus and Epimetheus (Protag. 320C - 322 D).

In the group under consideration this story

naturally comes first since it is the oldest in form and moreover, if we accept Dittenberger's[1] view of the order of Plato's dialogues it is also the oldest in time of all of these stories. This story is put in the mouth of a sophist and in it the dramatic and mimetic art of Plato clearly shines forth. In style it is Epic and has a highly poetic coloring. Protagoras has evidently a feeling of superiority over his hearers and wishes to amuse them as well as furnish a reply to the question at issue. Up to this point instead of coming at once to the question in hand, Protagoras could not refrain from self-laudation, giving a lengthy account of his principles and public career with occasional thrusts at his rivals, and now in reply to the question whether virtue (ἀρετή) can be taught or not, he asks if he shall

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[1] Hermes 16, 1881, S. 321 f. Schanz, however, places the Protag. after the Gorgias, but Zeller places it earlier which is perhaps its true position.

argue the point or use a myth ὡς πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις. Being given his choice, he chooses the latter and begins in an old-fashioned conventional way, Ἦν γάρ ποτε χρόνος —. Then follows a story based on the autochthonous origin of the Greeks and it is brought forward as an answer to the first of the three points in the discussion, namely why in a question of justice or any political virtue (πολιτικὴ ἀρετή) the Athenians allow every one to express an opinion, but permit only specialists in the case of carpentering or any other art. This is merely the starting point of the discussion and for the final result of the dialogue its value is mainly negative and it forms a part of a view which is to be refuted. In structure the story is simple. The sentences are strung together loosely in the fashion of the λέξις εἰρομένη, and the [illegible]

stories; yet the influence of the sophist [illegible] seen throughout. That Plato intends to give us here the sophistic manner of telling a story there can be little doubt. It is in the flowing style of Herodotus and has points of similarity with the stories of which the author is so fond, but Protagoras shows much more plainly his consciousness than does Herodotus. A certain amount of affectation is easily perceived. As contrasted with the rest of the speech of Protagoras we see in the myth a marked straining after archaism and poetry. This is shown by his many poeticisms(1), by his large use of the imperfect, and the vulgar frequency of the historical present(2).

In 321C and in 322A we have good examples of polysyndeton and the whole story shows a fondness for antithetical balance.

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1) Sauppe: Protagoras ad loc.

2) See page [illegible] above

Aristophanes' Tale (Symposium 189D-191D)

The Symposium is the most perfect and most finished of Plato's works and here especially the philosopher becomes the dramatic poet. It consists of a series of speeches and is extremely interesting from a literary point of view. The theme is Erôs, and already Phaedrus, Pausanius and Eryximachus have expressed their conceptions in his own [illegible] takes up the subject and continues the discussion. The opinions of those before him he does not accept, but he redintegrates, going back to the beginning. He considers that man have not praised Erôs worthily, for Erôs is the source of the greatest blessings to mankind. Yet before telling of the power of this Erôs, Aristophanes proposes to treat of the origin, nature and condition of man. With this statement he starts into his fantastic

story of the origin of the sexes, the primal man, [illegible] the [illegible] about. The story naturally falls in the past, but as it proceeds, it is varied by bringing in Zeus, but then again it falls back into the simple narrative style. The sentences are well constructed in accordance with the λέξις κατεστραμμένη and the diction is the simple elegant diction of conversation. As is seen in the large use of the imperfect[1] the story is almost wholly or, at least, very largely description and didactic; and with this there runs throughout the whole a vein of comedy. The frequent comparisons[2] assist in explaining the conceptions and they are also sometimes used with comic effect, as e.g. 190A, 191A. Perhaps Plato did not aim at an exact representation of the genial comedian yet this whole speech is much in the vein of

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[1] See page 67 [illegible]

[2] See [illegible]

the "Birds". Similar to the manner of Plato himself, Aristophanes uses a concrete example to express an abstract conception, but true to the comic nature of Aristophanes, the form chosen is grotesque and fantastic, being humorously and accurately carried out to the minutest details. Hug(1) points out scenes drawn from the true Aristophanes, and also the council of the gods is in the true Aristophanic spirit.

It is a mistake to suppose that this speech is all fun and has nothing serious, for Aristophanes is a preacher in his way, and his view is an advance on those that precede. From this fantastic story he derives a definition of Erôs: τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιθυμία καὶ δίωξις (192E), and his view is afterwards touched on by Socrates. The story serves as an introduction to the rest of the speech. As Hug(2) observes we have in chapter XV., in the

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1) Platons Symposion: Einleitung, S. XL. [illegible]
2) Ibid.: Einleitung, S. LII

narration of the παθήματα of the human race, a true model of a διήγησις.

The Ring of Gyges (Repub. II. 359 D – 360 B).

This story is simply a fictitious example introduced by Glaucon to illustrate the proposition that the just are just only because they have not the power to be unjust, for, if they had unrestrained liberty, they would follow their own desires as do the unjust. It has no philosophical worth, but is intended merely to elucidate this proposition, which is afterwards to be knocked down by Socrates. In style it is simple and straightforward, and is [illegible] in the [illegible]. Though the story is given in a brief compass, it is not inartistic, and such little touches as the way in which Gyges discovered and tested the magic power of the ring make it

more real and pleasing. Herodotus (1, 8-14) gi a very different story, but it has some analog to the present in that the two persons stand in the relation of sovereign and subject, and also the result in the same in each case. Herodotus gives his story in full making it as interesting as possible. Glaucon is not telling his story for the sake of the story, but rather to explain the position he is upholding – a position he has assumed simply for the sake of argument. Consequently everything which does not bear on the point is suppressed, and [illegible] nothing [illegible] to [illegible] the story a story [illegible] [illegible] is [illegible]. In [illegible] this [illegible] narrative is [illegible] different from the Socratic narratives, for in the latter there is always a healthy moral sentiment running through the whole. Such a sentiment however could not be expected here.

The Socratic Myths.

In the use of the myth we find here the distinctive feature of Plato, for he uses these not simply as myths, but as a part of his philosophy – they are a blending of μῦθος, and λόγος. In the order of development first comes μῦθος and then λόγος. For a time it would be all μῦθος, but gradually λόγος would assert itself until it became the sole occupant of the field; the originality of Plato's use consists in the blending of these two. The Socratic myths, however, as we have defined them, include two stories found in the Phaedrus which have no value for Plato's philosophy and must, therefore, be excepted from the above remarks. Since they are given in the name of Plato, they are important as representing his artistic side. These may be considered before discussing the philosophic myths.

The Cicadas (Phaedrus 259A – D).

Socrates has but lately emerged from his 'palinode' (257A) and the conversation begins to lag. Phaedrus has evidently been dazzled by the magnificence of the recantation and is becoming drowsy. To arouse his flagging spirits Socrates introduces this little story and ends with an exhortation to philosophical research. Its use is purely artistic, forming an interlude between the two main topics of the work; also it carries us back to the scenery of the dialogue, the plane-tree and the brook. The first part of the story is really an introduction – it is a hint which immediately arrests the attention of Phaedrus and then upon his solicitation the story of the cicadas is given, dwelling especially upon their [illegible] of [illegible], Socrates [illegible] this as an appeal to Phaedrus. The two

[illegible] in the [illegible]

Theuth, or The Invention of Writing (Phaedrus 274C-275B)

Up to this point Socrates has been disposing of a problem preliminary to the one proposed in 259E as the subject for the day's discussion, but now he returns to the original thread of the dialogue and with this story introduces the subject which has until then been kept in the back-ground: ὅπῃ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν καὶ ὅπῃ μή. In form the story is a legend and is used simply as an introduction to the discussion which follows.

At first the story is given in the indirect discourse but passes easily and naturally into the direct, after this comes a manner of dialogue between the god and the king, alternating with the more extended comments of the latter. In style it is very compact, with many terse sentences and with frequent hyperbaton, numbering about five examples.

Turning now to the philosophic or truly Platonic myths, we shall endeavor to give them, as far as possible, in the order of time and development.

The Judgment after Death (Gorgias 523A-524A)

This myth is evidently [illegible]. It is the simplest and apparently the most naive, forming a decided contrast with the elaborate myths of the Phaedrus and Republic. In the Gorgias Socrates has been waging war against rhetoric but there is [illegible] question, he [illegible] of the soul, and in order to show more clearly that happiness is not a matter of power, but of the soul he makes use of this story. As a part of the dramatic setting, this story is natural and appropriate and is framed in accordance with the persons of the dialogue(1).

It is well to notice the [illegible] with which

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(1) See [illegible]

Socrates begins his narrative: ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ .... λέγειν. From this we see that it is told for a moral purpose and so becomes a philosophical theory, and though Socrates does not care whether the story itself be considered a μῦθος or a λόγος, he is particular that the truth which underlies the scenic form shall fall with convicting power upon his audience, especially Callicles. It is mainly a concrete illustration and application of principles already stated before.

In point of style this myth is straightforward and simple, but elevated and with a majestic flow of the sentence. From its poetical nature the myth is necessarily figurative in its language, but in the myth itself each figure is made so clear and simple that there can be no mistake. Thus Socrates is particular to explain each point, as for example, ἀμπεχόμενοι .... κρίνονται· ζῶντες γὰρ

κρίνονται (523 C) &c. Owing to the exigencies of conversational style the narrative is broken and explanatory as in 523 C, D & E. Also an ἔφη or ἦ δ' ὅς is interjected to show that the speaker still continues the narration, as is the case when Zeus appears on the scene. Noticeable even here is Plato's fondness for paronomasia: e.g. δίκαι δικάζονται (523 C), οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται (ib.) Also a poetic word is not out of place (523 D), nor does Plato avoid colloquial forms in -τέον (523 D E)

Significant as bearing directly on the moral purpose of this story is the combination of the synonymous words δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως (523 A), ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως and τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης .... (ib. B). In this way he dwells longer on a thought to emphasize it; here also he places one set over against another by an antithetical balance. Most of the story is influenced by being [illegible] sentiment; the law being stated the rest is left to the gods.

Souls in the [illegible] [illegible] Phaedo ([illegible]-114c).

Though it is usual to place the Phaedo after some of the dialogues which come lower down in the list here presented, there is, however, some [illegible] for the present [illegible], and the myth here given naturally follows the one in the Gorgias, with which it has points of similarity. It is considerably longer and more elaborate than the Gorgias' myth, but it has a similar function, coming at the end of the dialogue, and also a resemblance in its moral tone. The theme of this dialogue is courage in the face of death, and Socrates has endeavored to show that one should [illegible] be courageous since there is no such thing as death, for the soul is immortal. Having established this he uses this story to emphasize the necessity of giving the proper care and training to the soul during the present life. In form the story

is complex, and its contents are drawn very largely from the popular religion. At first Socrates gives a brief sketch of the different condition of the untrained soul from that of the trained, but later [illegible] of [illegible], he seems to enlarge upon the beauties of the new world and the [illegible] and [illegible] of the infernal regions. The description forms a very fitting close to the last discourse of Socrates, and the exhortation at the end shows the myth was introduced mainly for its moral effect. In this story much of the beauty of the language in the dialogue is concentrated. However there are [illegible] [illegible] with [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] and pathetic humor. On the whole the sentences are periodic and care is taken for the proper emphasis of words, as is seen in the frequent occurrence of hyperbaton. Also synonymous words are combined with the effect, e.g. [illegible]

ἐκδὺς καὶ ἀνακύψας (109E), φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας τε (111B), βοῶσί τε καὶ καλοῦσι (114A), and similarly other examples could be cited altogether more than twelve in number. Noteworthy is πολὺ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμούς, in which the alliteration adds much to the effect. Polysyndeton is also frequent e.g. 110D+E., 111B., 112C.: in each case there is the enumeration of several objects. In the course of this story he uses as many as twelve comparisons which serve to enliven the picture and some add considerable vivacity.[1]

The Begetting of Erôs (Symposium 203A–204A).

The myth which we are now to consider has a marked allegorical meaning as is shown by Πόρος and Πενία, yet it is used to help to establish a point which is [illegible] the discussion. Socrates shows his [illegible] with a [illegible]

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[1] See above page 55

argument which overthrows all of his predecessors, using a simple distinction which has escaped them. Thereupon he proceeds to [illegible] the tale which he has heard from the wise Diotima, prefacing it with a portion of the conversation between them. Indeed, as Stug[1] shows, [illegible] [illegible].

The story is simple and is employed to explain the nature of Erôs as a Δαίμων, as intermediate between the divine and the mortal, as neither wise nor ignorant; and since the latter part of the story gives the attributes of Erôs, it amounts almost to a definition. For this reason the myth [illegible] tness of statement. Also such expressions as [illegible] (203 D) [illegible] the part of the narrator.

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[1] [illegible] S. LVII [illegible]

The Winged Souls (Phaedrus 246D-256E)

This story is one of the most magnificent among the myths. It is marvellous in its scenery with an artistic finish and an almost dithyrambic wildness in its expression, forming a most appropriate climax to the rich scenery of the Phaedrus — scenery such as we can find in no other dialogue of Plato. Like the myth just considered in the Symposium — this also has a decided allegorical coloring, but it is grander with more [illegible]. Like that, too, it is more than mere allegory, for, though in the beginning of the narration a tripartite division of the soul is made, it becomes, in the contemplation of souls, seemingly lost, and before entering upon a new phase of the subject Socrates thinks it necessary to revert to this (253C). Just before this descrip- of the winged steeds and the charioteer begins there is a short and magnificent description of

the "self-moved". This is the proem and it forms a general outline for the whole. From this with the help of a figure he passes to the description of souls both of gods and of men.

Especially noteworthy is the descriptive power shown in this narration. Throughout the whole there are graphic touches. The train of Zeus (246EF) furnishes an excellent example of description combined with rich music, and in 247DE by a few strokes he gives a pleasing picture of the gods. Notice how with the anaphora καθορᾷ μὲν --- δικαιοσύνην, καθορᾷ δὲ σωφροσύνην, καθορᾷ δὲ ἐπιστήμην he lingers over the privileges enjoyed by divine intelligence. In the characterization of the good and the bad horse (253DE) we have a graphic enumeration of details[1], to the effect of which the asyndeton and the antithetical balance contribute. Still more graphic is the rearing and pitching of the unru-

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1) Cf. above page 52

by [illegible] shows its [illegible] in the excessive use of the participle[1] (254B-E).

The style is largely descriptive with occasionally a logical tone, especially near the end, and he makes but slight use of comparisons considering the number in the myth of the Phaedo. There are in all about five. The sentences are periodic and sometimes involved, but have a rhythmical flow[2], asyndeton being frequent. Besides the usual combination of synonyms for stress, polysyndeton occurs in 248B, 250C, 252A, 252C; and asyndeton in 246E, 255E, also, as mentioned above, in the description of the good and the bad horse (253D) and in that of the unruly horse (254D).

[illegible] the diction is in keeping with the elevated style. As examples we might take δαῖτα καὶ -- θοίνην (247A), ἄκραν ... ἁψῖδα (247B), ὀπαδῶν (252C), ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν (254E).

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[1] See [illegible] page

[2] See above page 11

The Three Classes of Men (Republic III. 414D - 415C).

This story Socrates himself designates a μῦθος (415C), and he gives it with a display of [illegible]. In this it is different from the other myths, but still it has a bearing upon his ideal state. Socrates professes himself ashamed to tell what is only a repetition of the old Phoenician lie of Cadmus and his earthborn race. Yet the tale is told with gravity, and its resemblance to Greek tradition is a sufficient verification in spite of its seeming monstrousness. The Platonic [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible], just as was the case with the rest of the Greek states. Plato employs this myth that he may put forth in general terms the new principle of the transposition of ranks without going into details. [illegible]

First he begins with the statement of facts

and then gradually works up until he changes easily into the direct from of narration and addresses his ideal man as if present. On the whole it is lacking in embellishment, because of the vein of seriousness which pervades it.

The Vision of Er (Republic X. 614 B. to End).

This myth, though not so magnificent as that of the Phaedrus, has nevertheless a grandeur peculiarly its own, and it forms a most appropriate close to the Republic[1]. Here as in the Phaedo and Gorgias the myth gives a view of the future life, as supplementary to a discussion with regard to the soul. In the story there is a strange mingling of symbolism, mysticism, astronomy and mythology, giving a local arrangement wich is not perfectly clear.[2] It also has a decidedly oriental coloring. Socrates has just

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[1] See Stallbaum on Rep. X. 614 B. [2] Cf. above page 41

spoken of the recompenses which await the just and the unjust in this life and now he turns to those of the future life to show that the principles [illegible] are eternal and divine. The story opens with a pun and as it is reported from Er, Socrates uses the indirect form of narrative, with occasional changes to direct [illegible] report. In 617B and 619C we continue with a verbatim report and in 615D also, where we have a description of things that Er did not see. This latter example gradually shades off into indirect narrative towards the end, so that it is difficult to distinguish between Er and his informant. In 616D and 615C we have remarks interpolated by the narrator. In the former of these examples, just as above, it is hard to distinguish where the remarks of Socrates end and the account of Er is resumed. It makes no difference si

it is all true. Besides the pun in the opening of the story we also have a play on Ἄτροπος in ἀμετάστροφα (62[illegible]E). Λήθης πεδίον and Ἀμέλητα ποταμόν, οὗ [illegible] add touches of mysticism as well as of beauty to the myth. The story seems for the most part to be given in the 'strung-on' style or λέξις εἰρομένη. On account of this flowing style the terseness and brevity of such a passage as 617DE is [illegible]. The [illegible] has been much admired for its stately rhythm, and throughout the whole there are touches of beauty. It has a naturalness and a degree of earnestness which makes it highly credible. Not so with Cicero's 'Somnium Scipionis' which is an imitation of this myth, but inferior in dramatic power. It has not the grace and ease of the Greek model, and, while beautiful in many respects, it does not carry with it the weight of conviction as does the narrative of Plato. Cicero hardly

allows you to believe that what he is relating is true. The dream of Lucian[1], on the other hand shows this virtue in a manner worthy of Plato, but Lucian is more rhetorical. Very graphically he portrays the strivings of the two goddesses in their attempts to gain his favor. His narrative is vivid and stirring, but it lacks the mystical and moral element of Plato. The [illegible] [illegible] his story rhetorically, Plato morally. [illegible] furnishes us a manner of court scene in [illegible]; Plato gives us a view of a life after death, with its rewards and punishments. Lucian's is pleasing, but Plato's narrative is intended to persuade as well as please. More grandeur is shown in [illegible].

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[1] Ἐνύπνιον §5 f.

The Changing [illegible] (Politicus — 268C – 274E).

In this myth we have another phase of the earth-born race, — a notion of which Plato was very fond and which we have already seen in the 'Phoenician lie' in the Republic, — but the conception is unique in representing men to spring up full-grown, to dwindle and pass away again. As is usual with Plato, the story is adapted to [illegible] the lesson [illegible]. We [illegible] to [illegible] the fact that we are not living in a 'golden age' and under perfect conditions of life, but in actual world and under imperfect conditions so that we may not hold a false conception of the true statesman. With this in view the 'stranger' is made to give [illegible]

[illegible] formula [illegible]

is the main [illegible] of [illegible]. The whole myth is [illegible] imaginative majesty, and its form is simple and artistic [illegible]. The myth does not confine [illegible] but, as is Plato's manner, it touches on the larger aspect — the origin and necessity of evil, and so, at the end, the Stranger admits that he has allowed himself to draw out the discussion beyond what was absolutely necessary for the argument. Philosophically the [illegible] out the myth [illegible] conversation [illegible].

The myth is characterized by a certain terseness of style with a rhythmical flow of the periods. Hyperbaton is frequent, and also there is a certain fulness e.g. τὸ τῶν νεκρῶν σῶμα (271E) and [illegible] (271F). Further [illegible]

in 270B, 271A, 273A, and there is a recurrence of [illegible] 271C. [illegible] evidence of careful composition, and, though [illegible].

Atlantis (Timaeus 21A-25D, and the Critias)

The [illegible] is [illegible] and consists of two stories, the first of which is [illegible] by Critias. Critias, however, does not give all the details of the story, but it is reserved for the work bearing his name to bring out in full the wealth and power of the [illegible]ful island. The Timaeus begins with a summary of the Republic, then follows this story in which the indefinite city of the Republic becomes a place with a [illegible] but in a distant age. In other words it is more concrete in the Timaeus than in the Republic.

This story of Atlantis is one of unrivalled richness. [illegible] of detail and the oriental splendor of the [illegible] with the Atlantidae. It is Athens idealized.

[illegible] — The Origin of the Universe (Timaeus 27 D to end) — we find a story not less magnificent than the former, but deeply overlaid with speculations [illegible] with the vague fancies of his youth, but he seriously applies the myth to the discovery of prehistoric truth. Since the things here discussed are beyond the range of sense perception Plato proposes to give only the probable account, τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον (29 D), but he [illegible] it with the [illegible]

ception could have [illegible] to the.

This story follows in the strain struck out by Critias and it is as highly imaginative. Timaeus however, has a more difficult subject to deal with, and it is evidently [illegible] upon the style. Jowett[1] finds much fault with the style of the Timaeus. The language is [illegible] wanting [illegible] through the [illegible] few sentences. There is also a [illegible] style with obscure connection and a frequent use of apposition. On the other hand Prof. Shorey[2] finds the style rapid and flowing, but nothing of the elements so disagreeable to Jowett. To him unity, speed, moral unction, and religious awe are the keys to the art and thought, for the difficulties of style lie within the [illegible]

On the whole the criticism of Prof. Shorey is more

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[1] Plato vol. III pp. 526 & 527   [2]. A. J. P. Vol. 9 pp. 4[illegible]

ject, for considering the wide and diverse range of subjects which the Timaeus embraces, and also Plato's limited knowledge of the same it is not strange that his style is often abrupt and perhaps heavy. No one except a genius like [illegible] out of so discordant elements.

The Golden Age (Laws IV. 713B – 714A).

This short story is the last we are to consider, and as we began with a short simple story in the Gorgias, so we end these philosophical myths with a short story relating to the happy life in the time of Cronos. It is, however, not so fresh and vigorous as the one in the Gorgias. It [illegible] chiefly by way of example. Still there is present the moral quality peculiar to the true Platonic myths. As the tale draws to

[illegible] close the Athenian Stranger (713 E), urges the necessity of imitating the life which is said to have existed in the time of Cronus.

[illegible] these later myths we see a change from Plato's earlier manner. Here he is more mechanical and conscious, and lays more stress upon the outer side of the myth, [illegible] his aim is chiefly to instruct, to teach. Only in these later dialogues does he seriously apply the myth to the reproduction of past events. The Timaeus is a grand [illegible] [illegible]. In the Politicus the Stranger is particular to give [illegible] 11 e [illegible] from the argument to the myth and similarly at the end of the myth, he shows the [illegible]

[illegible] centred, a mechanical arrangement which

might properly be considered pure allegory, by [illegible] myths are more artistic. In the Symposium we have the allegorical side of the myth; in the Phaedo the imaginative. The great myth in the Phaedrus we have a combination and [illegible]. The Phaedrus also shows the artistic side in the use of two myths solely for that purpose.

Here we might mention the Protagoras, [illegible] matter. It is highly humorous and with an evident purpose to please and instruct. Thus we can find in Plato's dialogues the myth in every stage of development from the sophistic to the most intensely philosophical.

It will be noticed that Meno 81 A-C, which is usually included among the myths,

is omitted in this discussion. [illegible] [illegible] told here since it is a [illegible] Pindar and not a narrative. Also [illegible] Rep. [illegible] form. Besides these places we might mention [illegible] of extended metaphor, which sometimes involves a short narrative, e.g. Rep. 415E–416C. These [illegible]